

JPRS-EER-92-074
11 JUNE 1992



JPRS Report

East Europe

East Europe

JPRS-EEB-92-074

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Bulgarian Attitudes, Policy Toward Macedonia

6208409484 Skopje NOV4 MAKEDONIIA
in Macedonian 14 May 92 p 2

[Article by NOV4 MAKEDONIIA permanent correspondent Vladimir Talevski. "The Opening of a Diplomatic Mission as a Method for Bulgaria To Lecture Macedonia: Greater Bulgaria Motive Behind Solicitude"—first paragraph is NOV4 MAKEDONIIA introduction.]

[Text] "Anonymous" diplomatic sources, quoted in the newspaper DEMOKRATSIYA, are openly interfering in Macedonian domestic policy, not abandoning the worn-out Greater Bulgaria ideas. The Sofia press is accusing the Macedonian authorities in the Crnomarovo affair.

Sofia, 13 May—A delegation of the Bulgarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs left for Skopje, where it will discuss with the Macedonian authorities the purchase of a lot on which to build its diplomatic mission and the temporary rental of space in the Macedonian principal city to house the first diplomatic representatives. This information was published by the newspaper DEMOKRATSIYA, which is the organ of the ruling party, followed by the question of whether this clashes with the fact that Bulgaria and Macedonia have not yet restored diplomatic relations.

Citing an anonymous Bulgarian diplomatic source, the newspaper explained that the opening of a diplomatic mission in Skopje will not conflict with the fact that full diplomatic relations have not been established between the two countries because this will be a consular service. If meanwhile, diplomatic relations are established (things seem to be moving in that direction), the mission will then be elevated to embassy status. This project, which is essentially a routine operation, has been raised by the SDS [Union of Democratic Forces] party organ to a much higher level, thus making it possible to lecture the Macedonian authorities. The newspaper began by warning the readers that the discussions will be difficult, allegedly because the current authorities in Skopje "oppose" the demand for an active official Bulgarian presence in Macedonia.

Continuing to lecture the Macedonian politicians, this "anonymous" source claims that, "of late," Bulgaria has noticed a "clear increase of Macedonism" in the Republic and of anti-Bulgarian feelings. These are strange but well-known stories dating from T. Zhivkov's time, this time expanded with some comments on the situation in Macedonian party life. Thus, DEMOKRATSIYA considers itself justified in blaming the Macedonian authorities for a purely internal political affair, such as replacing Dimitar Crnomarovo in the VMRO-DPMNE [Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization-Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity]. According to Sofia, he was replaced because of his initiative in accepting medical drugs from Bulgaria. To complete the picture, versions are once again being fabricated of alleged cases of mistreating

Macedonian soldiers during the war in the Balkans. The newspaper fails to mention, however, that even the now irrefuted Crnomarovo story is contradicted by the truth, he is accusing the Macedonian authorities and even the newspaper NOV4 MAKEDONIIA for not telling it all this, according to Talevski. In fact, the Bulgarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs has long complained about "violations of Bulgarian sovereignty" in Macedonia.

Thanks to this "anonymous" diplomatic source, we can very well surmise the program for Bulgaria's foreign press carries in its briefcases as it enters Macedonia. It will find a site on which to build a diplomatic mission, and if God it will be refused, it will lecture the authorities, who lately have been sharply criticized for not restoring an independent foreign policy, and for not following the distant engineering in Brussels. It will be thinking it possible if we accept the version made by this "diplomatic source" that the MFA in Sofia has appeared naive in the course of its foreign policy. In 1945, Bulgaria was the first to recognize the Albanian state's independence and the country's first to recognize the people as a conscious party to the war. The source is discovering some kind of "Macedonism" in the SDS directly negating the existence of the MFA's own policy and preaching some kind of policy of "human rights."

Clearly, Bulgarian diplomatic sources are not aware of the new data on the situation in Macedonia. On the other hand, and this is a more serious matter, the mindsets which inform Bulgarian foreign policy in international affairs and in the sphere of relations with neighboring familiar Greater Bulgaria states are still based on the idea of treating the "Macedonian problem" as a purely internal matter of Bulgaria. "Helping" the "Macedonian" authorities, Bulgarian diplomats, who are not used to working in European style, are finding "difficulties" in accepting the opposition to state intervention in the internal affairs of the sovereign "Macedonian" state. They have assumed the role of manipulators of the "Macedonian" possible solutions that would be in line with their own.

In an effort to explain the "Macedonian problem" in political geometry, some Bulgarian sources are making a logical step by Bulgaria's "not recognizing" the "Macedonian" relations with Macedonia, which are not yet officially recognized.

Actually, the "anonymous" source in the Skopje article has no alternative. It is aware of the fact that the SDS has stated that Macedonia "has no alternative" and that the new Serbian Vukobratovic is not going to let the MFA either would mean no more aid from Bulgaria, or, at the common national level, no more aid from the "suffering" sister of mother Bulgaria.

DE MA concludes all the foregoing with a series of observations on the question of the "Macedonian" in Macedonia: that Bulgaria is "not recognizing" the "Macedonian"

Macedonia would be easier. However, it claims that it would be much more dignified if this included the threat of failure and if diplomatic relations with Macedonia were resumed. According to DUMA, there is no alternative, and the entry of Bulgaria into Europe makes sense only if it is achieved together with Macedonia.

The recommendation of the commentator in the socialist party organ is clear: Bulgaria must struggle for

Macedonia even if it is "busted out" in this battle with the European Community! Why? For the simple reason that, according to the Greater Bulgaria prescriptions that are being submitted and promoted in some circles here, one would not dare abandon participation in splitting the "Balkan pie" by "close brothers and sisters" and under the patronage of the European powers, who are quite skilled in such matters.

Rumi on Views of Former Reform Communists

VZCH05924 Prague REFLEX in Czech No. 16, 1992
p. 11

[Interview with Deputy Federal Minister of Interior Jan Rumi by Bohumil Pecinka, place and date not given. "A Closely Watched Man"—first paragraph is REFLEX introduction]

[Text] He is Deputy Federal Minister of Interior Jan Rumi. A man of sharp formulations and uncompromising judgments, thanks to which he has become for the leftist press a persona demonized into unreal dimensions.

[Pecinka] Deputy Minister, your recent dispute with Minister Sabata may be understood as a dispute between two concepts, two views of the nature of post-November changes. On your side it is an anticommunist accent, emphasis on discontinuity. Sabata on the contrary emphasized that this revolution must be antibureaucratic, based on a gradual reform of the Communist system. How do you see this dispute?

[Rumi] This is a dispute not just between two different political concepts but also a dispute over the way of conducting politics. A dispute between open politics, which is immediately accountable to both parliament and public and is transparent, and politics behind closed doors, which is essentially uncontrollable.

Sabata is not alone in his views because he is representative of the entire group of reform Communists who believed that after November 1989 they would take power. For this they were also equipped with contacts to Moscow, Gorbachev, and the whole perestroika crowd. Their principal ideologue is Mlynar, who perhaps harbored hopes that he would ascend to the vacated CPCZ [Communist Party of Czechoslovakia] throne. They imagine that socialism can be restored in its "correct" version, given a different face. But the majority of our society has rejected it with an equivocal "no" and decided to part ways with the former system in its entirety.

Zdenek Jicinsky, one of the prominent Eurocommunists, maintained still in November 1989 that one cannot abide legal discontinuity, presumably because it would disrupt the entire legal order. Of course this is not true because it was enough to separate private from public law and precisely within it carry out this discontinuity. Naturally the former Communists were unwilling to do this and tried only to take over the former system and refashion it somehow.

[Pecinka] Decisions on the nature of the post-November changes probably began to be made only in the summer and fall of 1990 when developments took a clear trend toward destruction of the former system.

[Rumi] And they acquired an increasingly anticommunist character because people began to fear a possible restoration of the former system. Concurrently a moral

indignation began to spread, stemming from the fact that if we want to build a law-governed state we must first condemn perpetrators of the evil—the Communist system and the party. And again as if in reaction to this trend Mlynar and Jicinsky began to promote a model emanating from the legal system built over the past 40 years. This dispute continues to this day and will be resolved only in this year's elections.

[Pecinka] What arises here is an altogether paradoxical situation when the Left criticizes the screening [ustraneni] law and everything connected with it, even though the responsibility for it is actually its own. The screening law must be understood by everyone as a reaction to a certain unsatisfactory social condition, and not a necessity.

[Rumi] I agree. Here we did not need any screening law at all if only the top politicians had decided after the overthrow to carry out truly radical changes. Then for instance a co-opted parliament would have to very quickly pass simple laws, or one could have a provisional government by presidential decrees. The Communist Party would be dissolved immediately and there would be no need for a law directing the CPCZ to return its properties to the people and the whole unseemly haggling around it. Of course the OF [Civic Forum] had wings that would support such measures but they were outvoted by the reform-Communist wing which had its concept dating back at least to 1968.

[Pecinka] When I recently read Mlynar's article in RUDÉ PRAVO titled "Police in Politics" I realized that the tragedy of his generational group lies in their tendency to apply their experience—gained inside Communist power—to the completely different situation at present and in their inability to offer anything positive except criticism.

[Rumi] In the article Z. Mlynar himself uses the formulation that the current power elite is creating some sort of a conspiracy theory to divert the citizen's attention from problems which trouble them.

But he seems totally unaware that he himself is spinning a conspiracy theory, that supposedly some power elite here wants to misuse the police, that is a typical conspiracy theory, but only in his head. Moreover, what is the power elite? On the one hand he talks about a power elite and on the other about the right. But of course we all know that in the governments the right lacks preponderance and in the federal cabinet it is on the contrary in a pronounced minority.

At the same time Mlynar does not want to hear about the legacy of the past because he would have to admit that the root of all difficulties lies there. He himself held high political office at a time when the police not just intervened in politics but in fact directly determined it. He remembers that time very well, wants to forget it and is trying to foot the consequences on us.

[Pecinka] It is a peculiar psychological process. Mlynar moves around in Czechoslovakia like Marx. Covered by life in a devout capitalist society, he is importing socialism to us. But society is not interested in it. The great lion of ideological salons suddenly finds that his train has left the station and that he is left only with RUDÉ PRAVO and an ideology no one listens to. It is a rather ridiculous affair.

[Rumi] The top "sixty-eighters" are really masters of ideology, but when they were confronted for instance by the Klaus group in the field of economics it turned out that, although excelling in intrigue and rhetoric, they lack a positive economic program and precisely due to the way they approach politics, cannot even have one.

Indeed, these people disdain not only economics but also social reality in general. They know very well that presently a large number of people feel insecure. In the final analysis insecurity is the individual's basic existential feeling. We are born into insecurity and spend our entire lives in it. If today the "sixty-eighters" talk about social insecurity, they only paraphrase this basic human feeling and misuse it ideologically.

I believe it shows beautifully in Sabata's regular commentaries in ROVNOST where he conducts himself as an opposition publicist rather than a responsible government minister. In the last few weeks he has visibly assumed the stance of Meciar's ideologue in the Czech lands.

This is because he realizes full well that the Meciar trend will gain great strength in Slovakia in the future, and correctly anticipates that the CSFR will not break apart and there will have to be a compromise between the differing victorious political forces in both republics. He believes that through Slovakia he will be able to exert influence on Czech politics where he has already been written off. Therefore he maintains contact with Meciar even though it is unpopular in the Czech lands. Unlike many other politicians he sees farther and senses the direction of future developments.

[Pecinka] Although Minister Langus made repeated sharp references to corruption in the police force, RUDÉ PRAVO remained silent on these charges. But when you said something similar in a far gentler way, the paper unleashed a campaign. Why did they choose precisely you?

[Rumi] Langus does not disturb them politically and although we are close in many of our views they evidently take him for his pronounced Christian orientation as a more or less neutral politician. To them I am far too uncompromising and they sense that I am a sensitive link in the emerging right. They chose me because of the office I hold.

It is very tempting to attack a deputy federal minister of interior for misusing information for political purposes. They know about me that I am an impulsive person

always speaking my mind fully and when some statement is torn out of context and garnished with a suitable commentary it may lead to allegations about some kind of a new totality. They are simply trying to insinuate to the public that I am not trustworthy.

[Pecinka] The funny thing is that RUDÉ PRAVO should fear politicization of the police but is totally remiss in pointing to the main instrument of politicization, which is the currently emerging NOSP police trade union. Do you think it could become a fifth column inside the interior ministry?

[Rumi] Far be it from me to create conspiracy theories, but the NOSP union has not come into being to defend police officers' interests. It is a structure which basically copies the CPCZ base organizations. Incidentally, NOSP does not include any of the people who came here after November, but on the contrary consists of people who have worked here for right up to 12 years. You must realize that NOSP is something of a strange organization inside an armed corps. For my taste such a small state has far too many armed formations and unlike the federal police they are not very transparent. So if someone is really concerned about politicization and the danger of misusing repressive agencies, he ought not to concern himself with irrelevant problems.

[Pecinka] Let us take this last sentence as a message to certain people.

Origin, Destination of Foreign Capital in CSFR

92CH0589C, Prague EKONOMIKA, Czech No. 19, May 92, pp. 18-20.

[Article by JUDITA ŠTOURACOVÁ, "Origin and Destination of Foreign Capital"]

[Text] In conceiving the basic elements of economic reform, particularly the internal convertibility of the Czechoslovak koruna and liberalization of foreign trade, as well as during the formulation of expected changes in the development of the Czechoslovak economy, participation of foreign capital and external financial resources was considered to be a requisite for the realization of key reform measures.

From the viewpoint of its external economic position, the Czechoslovak economy was characterized in the prereform period by a gross debt of about \$8 billion (\$7.9 billion in 1989, and \$8.1 billion in 1990), with the expectations that by the end of 1991 it will increase to the level of \$11-12 billion. The amount of foreign currency reserves at the end of 1990 was relatively low (\$1.3 billion); it was assumed that its volume will have to be increased in 1991 to at least \$2.5 billion, which would resolve the impact of the changed external conditions on the one hand, and also would be a guarantee for meeting the expected increased demand for foreign currencies (particularly in connection with the assumed increase of import activities by enterprises and business companies, as well as for tourist activity by Czechoslovak citizens).

Estimates for the necessary financial resources, on which the restructuring and modernization of the Czechoslovak industrial base are contingent, are generally higher—they fluctuate at the level of tens of billions of U.S. dollars, and they quite naturally assume the influx of financial means from abroad, particularly in the form of foreign investments, joint ventures, and last but not least, in the form of loans for restructuring.

A very rough estimate of the overall amount of foreign financial resources that flowed into CSFR during 1991 is about \$3.2 billion; the main contributors were

- International financial institutions (International Monetary Fund, World Bank);
- Groups of countries (group of G-24 countries, European Community);
- Governments, or government institutions (bilateral intergovernmental assistance);
- Foreign entrepreneurs (direct foreign investments).

Loans From International Financial Institutions

International Monetary Fund

Extremely important for the "startup" of the economic reform was the position of the International Monetary Fund, which granted Czechoslovakia at the very beginning of 1991 a relatively large credit framework and a loan in the amount of 1,250 million SDR¹ (i.e. about \$1,780 million), divided into three parts:

Stand-by arrangement in the amount of 619.5 million SDR (about \$886 million), which represents 105 percent of the CSFR membership quota.

Credit within the framework of the so-called Compensatory and Contingency Financing Facility (CCFF) in the amount of 483.8 million SDR (about \$687 million) for financing the expected higher costs of oil imports; this type of credit was granted CSFR in the equivalent of 82 percent of the membership quota, which is the maximum possible amount.

Contingency Financing Facility-Element (risk credit), linked to the Stand-by arrangement, it guarantees 147.5 million SDR (about \$211) for a possible further increase in the price of oil.

Within the framework of the agreed-upon credit, IMF determined the amounts of the individual five portions, gradually released within the period of five months for which the credit framework was set, as well as the conditions and performance criteria, on the fulfillment of which the release of the money was contingent.¹

Individual IMF missions carried out routine evaluation of the extent to which the agreed-upon criteria were met and the economic program of the CSFR Government (formulated in connection with the CSFR negotiations for the loans) fulfilled, which was the basis upon which individual portions were released to Czechoslovakia

practically without problems. Because of the developments in the price of oil on the world market, it was not even necessary to use the risk credit in its entirety. Altogether, during last year CSFR received \$1,312 million from the IMF, which had a positive influence on the balance of payments and contributed to relatively better results in the indicators of the external payment position than was expected; at the end of 1991, foreign currency reserves amounted to \$3.4 billion, gross debt was equal to \$9.3 billion, and in contrast to the minus values at the end of 1990, during 1991 we achieved a surplus in the current balance of payments.

During the second half of 1991, other funds from the World Bank, the G-24 group and the EC were added to the thus far only resources from the IMF, and last but not least, the influx of capital from private entrepreneurs also increased.

World Bank

Credits by the World Bank were granted, or rather made ready, in several blocks and were intended for the support of the balance of payments, or to cover its deficit, also to support the development of the financial sector, and for financing the development and modernization of other selected sectors of the Czechoslovak economy (power industry, telecommunications, environment).

In comparison with the IMF, whose interest is focused primarily on the macroeconomic side of the economic reform, the focus of interest of the executive directors of the World Bank and its individual missions during negotiations of the conditions for the loans was, on the contrary, the area of macroeconomic problems of the reform processes.

The Structural Adjustment Loan (SAL) was granted to Czechoslovakia in the total amount of \$450 million, of which the first portion of \$200 million was drawn during the past year. This is credit earmarked for covering the trade deficit, support of structural changes of the Czechoslovak economy and the process of its transformation. The second and third portions (both in the amount of \$125 million) are expected to be drawn during the course of this year. Same as the IMF loan, the release of the individual portions of the World Bank funds is contingent on the acceptance and implementation of elements of market economy (realization of the privatization processes, restructuring of enterprises, abolishment of subsidies, liberalization of prices, and so forth).

Loan "ENERGY" is earmarked for the resolution of the energy problems of the Czechoslovak economy. Its amount is equal to \$200 million, while the conditions for using it are still the subject of negotiations and are contingent on the presentation of specific projects by CSFR.

Loans and Financial Assistance by Groups of Countries

The G-24 Group

The group of the 24 most advanced countries (G-24) pledged at their summit in Rome at the end of 1990 to give financial assistance to countries in Central and East Europe. Czechoslovakia was promised a total amount of \$1 billion as support for the introduction of internal convertibility of the koruna and the realization of other steps of the economic reform. It was agreed that the activities of the G-24 group will be coordinated by the EC Commission and realized in roughly three dimensions:

EC countries (bilaterally)	\$500 million
G-24 countries (bilaterally)	\$500 million
• if that (preliminary)	
Japan	\$200 million
Canada	\$21 million
Austria	\$50 million
Switzerland	\$40 million
Korea	\$50 million
Sweden	\$21 million
Norway	\$14 million
Finland	\$15 million
United States	\$15 million
Turkey	\$1 million

At the end of last year Czechoslovakia signed an agreement with the EC Commission for a loan in the amount of ECU [European Currency Unit] 375 million,¹ i.e., about \$450 million, to be drawn in two portions, of which the first, i.e., \$248, was already granted and drawn last year. In 1991 Czechoslovakia was for the time being given only about \$90 million of the promised funds from the other G-24 countries.

Program PHARE

Program PHARE [Economic Reconstruction Aid for Poland and Hungary] came into being in 1989 on the initiative of the G-24 group, as a program to assist the restructuring of economies first in Poland and Hungary and since 1990 also of Bulgaria, Rumania, Yugoslavia, and CSFR (in 1992 this program was expanded to include Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, and Albania, but, on the other hand, the assistance to Yugoslavia has been halted since 1991). The program is financially guaranteed by EC, and all its activities are coordinated by the EC Commission. Funds from the program are apportioned to individual countries on the basis of the general criteria of the EC Commission (number of inhabitants, level of the GNP per inhabitant, external debt of the country, absorption capacity of the economy from the standpoint of financial means).

The procedure for gaining effective financial assistance from PHARE program is not simple. It devolves from the basic document, which is the Indicative Program, signed by the representatives of the partner countries and expressing the agreed-upon basic priorities of the development of relevant sectors of the national economy, suggested for financing by the PHARE program in a given year with the expectation that they will be maintained as priorities in the following years. After that follows the presentation of proposals for financial agreements (memoranda), and on the basis of their approval the preparation of a six-month detailing of the sector program begins. Only after it is accepted and agreed upon by the EC Commission for PHARE is it possible to begin realization of the projects, while the funds for this realization are allocated gradually, always for a maximum of six months.

In view of the fact that Czechoslovakia joined the PHARE program only in the second half of 1990 and did not yet have a fully prepared overview of its priorities and financial requirements for their implementation, all activities (with the exception of the TEMPUS program—education) connected with the PHARE program were shifted to 1991. Its framework was created by the allocated funds in the amount of ECU/99 million (i.e., about \$125 million), which were allocated to these basic areas:

	Allocated Funds (ECU million)
Restructuring and privatization	19
Development of small and medium businesses	20
Restructuring of the labor market	11
Environment	5
Power Industry	5
Telecommunications	5
TEMPUS	9
General technological assistance	20

This allocated amount of ECU/99 million was used last year only in part, distributed and used was altogether ECU/14 million, for the time being only in three areas: restructuring and privatization, TEMPUS, and general technical assistance. In the other areas all necessary preparatory work, preliminary to the realization of individual projects and drawing of the allocated funds, is underway.

Technical Assistance

Foreign financial assistance, given in the form of the so-called "noninvestment, or technical, assistance" is realized largely within the framework of bilateral cooperation with advanced countries, to a certain extent in cooperation with international organizations (particularly with organizations of the United Nations, OECD, and NATO) and nongovernmental organizations, in the form of financial contributions from resources of

regional institutions of some countries, civic movements, initiatives, and grants even from the private sector.

It is characteristic for this type of foreign financial assistance that only a very small portion of the given funds is directly usable materially and effectively by Czechoslovak entities, because they are mostly managed by the governments of the donor country or a nongovernmental institution. The funds are as a rule used to defray costs of activities of foreign educational, training, counseling, and consulting institutions carried out in behalf of CSFR, work of foreign experts, professors, and advisors in Czechoslovakia, financing of temporary residences of Czechoslovak students, pedagogues, and specialists abroad, installation and operation of information centers in CSFR, etc.

Judged by the size of the population, the largest donors thus far of the non-investment-technical-assistance to Czechoslovakia are Switzerland and the Netherlands, in the first place by absolute volume of means provided through this assistance is the United States, ahead of Germany, Switzerland, Great Britain, the Netherlands, and France.

The United States is active especially in financing projects aimed at supporting the privatization processes and development of the private sector (among them are especially the Czechoslovak-American Entrepreneurial Fund for granting favorable loans to private entrepreneurs in the amount of \$60 million for 1990-92); apart from that, together with Canada and Great Britain the United States gives financial assistance to teachers of English in Czechoslovakia. Great Britain established on behalf of CSFR the so-called "Know-How Fund" in the amount of 25 million pounds sterling, from which are financed costs of educating managers, experts, and language teachers and their study residences in Great Britain.

Expressed in numbers, the total amount of this non-investment-technical assistance given, or being given, to Czechoslovakia on a bilateral or multilateral basis can be very roughly approximated at about \$300 million for 1990-91, and at about \$470 million as an estimate for the period of 1990-93.

Direct Foreign Investments

Direct foreign investments, as the most important and presently the most frequent form of foreign capital participation, are realized in the Czechoslovak conditions mostly through joint ventures (JVs). An exact determination of their status and influx is complicated by the current system of recordkeeping, which cannot express in every detail the immediate situation not only from the standpoint of the number of foreign participants, but especially from the standpoint of the amount of working capital in comparison with issued capital, and understandably neither from the standpoint of the number of and capital investment by foreign participants in the second round of the small privatization.

Relatively detailed information about recorded, registered, and functioning enterprises with foreign ownership participation, their listing according to the amount of invested capital, their direction-line of business, as well as their structure according to the country of domicile of the participants in individual joint ventures is concerned, were contained in the article by Engineer Jaroslava Durdinová, CSc., "Is Czechoslovakia Sufficiently Attractive to Foreign Capital?" (EKONOM No. 12/1992).

To supplement it, let us add, in the context of information contained in the foregoing part of this article, that in 1991—according to preliminary data of the capital account of the balance of payments—the influx of direct foreign investments into CSFR amounted to roughly \$600 million, while at the same time toward the end of the period in question there was a tendency toward reorientation of the main capital streams from the service sector into the industrial production sphere. In the Czech Republic, this concerns mainly the automobile industry, production of technical and pure gases, manufacture of machinery and equipment for the power industry, and the chemical and rubber processing industries. The influx of foreign capital into organizations of individual branches is very unequal in the two republics.

From the standpoint of the amount of the invested capital it still holds true that predominant are joint ventures with a low foreign capital investment. In the Czech Republic—according to the CR ministry of industry—the structure of established and registered joint ventures in 1991, classified according to the criterion of the above mentioned amount of invested foreign capital, was as follows:

Amount of Foreign Capital	Number of Joint Ventures
More than Kčs10 billion	1
Kčs1-10 billion	2
Kčs500 million-1 billion	5
Kčs100 million-500 million	1
Kčs10 million-100 million	9
Kčs1 million-10 million	29
Less than Kčs1 million	31

An analogous situation exists in industrial enterprises of the Slovak Republic, whose participation with foreign capital will be discussed in an article planned for publication in one of the future issues of EKONOM.

In comparison with the estimate or speculation about how capital-intensive the restructuring processes of the transforming Czechoslovak economy will be, the present influx of foreign capital appears somewhat insignificant. The still predominant hesitant attitude and unconvincing activity of foreign investors, as a certain indicator of a comprehensive evaluation of the attractiveness of our economic environment from the viewpoint of the microsphere, contrasts with the unequivocally positive

evaluation of the indicators of the CSFR macroeconomic development not only by international financial and economic institutions such as the IMF, World Bank, European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, European Investment Bank, EC Commission, etc., but also by representatives of private banks.

For the next stages of the development of Czechoslovak economy, therefore, the heart of the problem is the essential development of activities that create an entrepreneurial terrain comparable with the global, or rather the European, standard from the standpoint of parameters of its attractiveness to foreign investors. By that is understood especially the existence and cultivation of a stable macroeconomic, political, social, but also a legislative framework for entrepreneurs and investors who come with capital at their disposal.

Footnotes

1. SDR-Special Drawing Rights, a unit used by the IMF, the actual rate of exchange is 1 SDR to \$1.36 (April 1992). On the date the loan was granted (January 1990) the exchange rate was 1 SDR to \$1.42.

2. In question was the fulfillment of these criteria of monetary policy during 1991.

a. Increase the bank gross foreign currency reserves, i.e., foreign currency assets (by \$1.6 billion).

b. Improve the state of the bank net foreign currency reserves, or decrease the negative balance between assets and debts (by \$1.7).

c. Decrease the debt of the public sector to banks (by Kcs24.8 million).

d. Increase bank assets vis-a-vis the nonbank sector, i.e., particularly credits granted to enterprises and the public (at the most by 23 percent).

e. Draw foreign government and bank credit, payable in 12 years, to the maximum amount of \$1 billion.

3. The ECU exchange rate is currently (April 1992) 1 ECU equals \$1.26.

Program To Improve Prague's Ecological Condition

VJCH0591A (Prague *EKONOM* in Czech No 18, 1992 pp 45-49)

[Article on interview with M. Doubrava, head of the Department of Environmental Conservation, Prague, by Alena Adamkova, place and date not given: "Will Prague Restore Its Health? On a Program for Improving the Capital's Environment"]

[Text] One of last year's issues of our magazine carried rather alarming data on the environmental situation in our capital city comparable perhaps only to northern Bohemia. But a mere recitation of the facts, however alarming they are, does not do much to improve the situation. Hence the Czech government has directed the Prague city administration to prepare as speedily as

possible a program for improving the capital's environment, similar to the program already prepared for ecological restoration of northern Bohemia and one presently in the works for the Ouzava region. This material should offer the basic guideline for tackling Prague's ecological problems in the nearest future. We discussed the main points of the report now being readied with Eng. M. Doubrava, head of the department of environmental conservation in the Prague city administration, who prepared the material.

One of the key requirements for improving Prague's ecological situation is undoubtedly the assurance of adequate funding. The necessary investment was put at 25 billion korunas (Kcs), an amount not likely to be available within the near future. This year alone we are Kcs2.826 billion short in covering the most urgent costs (Kcs). 209 billion will come from the government budget and Kcs2.351 billion will then accrue from city resources, such as revenues of municipal enterprises, sale of public facilities, renting nonresidential premises and other fees). Therefore it was necessary to set an order of priorities, that is, problems the solution of which cannot be put off without endangering the very life of the city. So the first priority goes to the issue of waste management, specifically the construction of a new landfill and incinerator. Second in the order of priority is the construction of a new sewage filtration plant, and in third place is the problem of assuring adequate supply of drinking water. Moved only to the fourth order of priority was improvement in the city's air quality which is also highly unsatisfactory yet does not present an immediate threat to Prague's functioning as a city.

So what improvements may Prague citizens expect in the next few years? In the area of waste management it will be at least a new landfill at Dablice and an incinerator at Malesice, both probably in 1993. The incinerator's construction is 100 percent funded from the government budget (this year Kcs700 million) and the landfill from city funds (an estimated Kcs205 million); moreover, a foreign investor is being sought. There should be gradual introduction of separated waste collections, prospectively then the construction of sorting facilities and recycling plants.

In the sector of sewage purification the situation is no less critical. Of the 7 cubic meters per second flowing into the existing central sewage treatment plant, 8 cubic meters is not treated at all, 1.6 cubic meters only mechanically and only the rest by the biological-mechanical method because the treatment plant has insufficient capacity. A problem is also caused by the disposal of treatment sludge which contains a large quantity of heavy metals and consequently is unsuitable for farm use. In order to bring the method of treating waste water into compliance with the water law it is necessary to build a new treatment plant as soon as possible. But that will cost some Kcs8 billion and moreover the decision on where to site it is still outstanding (the Cisarovy island and Hostin near Melnik are under consideration). Thus a temporary solution will be to

intensity the original treatment plant so that the quality of the discharged waters will at least approximate the desired standards. But a decision on the site of the new treatment plant ought to be made as soon as possible after which the process begins to select the concrete for the entire project. This year too we expect completion of a sewer conduit (shvoda) underneath the Vltava River and there ought to be progress in reconstructing the unsatisfactory sewer system. But this year's funding for upgrading the existing treatment plant seems falls short by Kcs100 million, and another 100 million korunas is lacking for reconstruction of the sewer system.

We have a very tense situation also in regard to Prague's supply of drinking water. Underground aquifers are for the most part unsuitable for this purpose and the current capacity of drinking water sources covers the city's needs only to a small "only just." Meanwhile the quality of water drawn from the Vltava is very poor, especially in the summer months, and moreover the waterworks at Puchov is in a deplorable condition and requires immediate reconstruction. Water from another source at Kaseov is at threat from petroleum residues in the former military area of Milevsko and water from the Zlávka creek which supplies 34 percent of Prague's needs contains excessive quantities of borates as well as phosphates which enter the water from the surrounding fields and farm enterprises. Here it leads to an excessive growth of algae which causes considerable difficulties in pumping. Moreover the water level in the Zlávka reservoir has been below normal already for a number of years even though there is now hope that it will finally fill up again after the spring thaw.

The water pipe system also is in a deplorable condition and loses 26 percent of the water produced. Water consumption in the capital city itself is excessively high—400 liters per person per day, whereas in the FRG it is only 230-240 liters per person per day, and the price charged for drinking water will remain below the total cost incurred with its supply.

Reconstruction of the Puchov waterworks alone requires Kcs170 million this year, but only Kcs140 million is assured. Reconstruction of water distribution networks is another Kcs80 million short. So the construction of a new source of drinking water supply for Prague is for now only the stuff of future dreams. Under consideration is the future event of drawing water off the Vltava above its confluence with the Sázava, both of course assuming also the construction of a new waterworks.

Prague's air quality has become an acute problem, with its pollution levels higher exceeding the extreme average levels northern Bohemia is worse off, but only in one measurement—in sulphur dioxide emissions. In the city center the primary sources of air pollution include local heating and transport; on the city margins it is large factories and heating and power plants. The solution lies in a transition to heating (natural gas, centralized heat

supply in existing heating and furnace facilities, conversion to gas and heating by electricity locally in the city center. Some help could come also in the form of heat supplies from the Mladá power plant, but because of lack of funding and interminable disputes about the suitability of such a solution the construction of a heating conduit from Mladá was halted. An improvement may come also thanks to the new ordinance on catalytic converters to take effect on 1 April of this year: within the capital city (as of 1 October of this year all automobiles in used by organizations or used in emergency services and capable of running on unleaded gas must be equipped with catalytic converters effective 1 October 1991) this will apply to all cars capable of running on unleaded gas, with others required to meet minimum limits. Of importance for improving air quality in Prague will be also completion of the communication system now under construction and subject to continuing debate. The measures will include also an ordinance on living conditions which was debated in the council of the city board of representatives in early April but unfortunately has not been approved as yet.

Most of these measures however again fall through because of lack of finance. Conversion to gas and reconstruction of furnace facilities alone this year falls Kcs143 million short of the required 170 million, completion of the transport system falls Kcs66 million short of the proposed Kcs100 million (only 450 million will be made available from the government budget); there is lack of money also for repairing communications and expansion of the subway, one of Prague's ecological construction projects.

There is also insufficient care of public green spaces and maintenance of residential and public buildings. Farm production should gradually adjust to more ecological requirements, within the near future a system ought to be created for preserving and creating public green spaces.

But what is not found in the program under discussion but according to Ing. Dvořák is not less important prerequisite for improving Prague's environmental situation is ecological education. Without it, in his opinion, there cannot be any pronounced turn for the better. If people fail to realize that they themselves too must take part in improving the environment, if they do not begin to sort their waste, stop littering the streets, despoiling greenery, driving cars without catalytic converters, if they do not begin to conserve drinking water and so on, it will be difficult to improve anything. In this regard they should get some help from a massive public information campaign: there we could learn from the advertising by some foreign companies, for instance Procter and Gamble, and so on, as well as suitable economic laws and legislation (a law on ecological education is being drafted). Of importance according to Ing. Dvořák is also improvement in government administration in the environmental field and in strict separation from self-government, as well as equipping the government administration with appropriate powers. Environmental issues should be decided primarily by experts, self-government ought to have an advisory voice only.

Czech-Polish Border Town Dispute Examined

42/754/44 Warsaw *PRÓBLEMY* (PROBLEMS) (continued)
in *Polish* 30 Apr-1 May 77 p. 171

[Article by Bronisław Pruszyński] (1. Language: Legat¹)

[Text] Masura's most basic task remains and this is why he is taking a trip to the other side of the border. He is going to see Łazarek, his guarantor. He will not return, words but will forget his enthusiasm and ask himself: "Mr. General, is it true that you told Masura how he could resolve the Polish minority problem in Czechoslovakia?"

Masura says: "The members of the Polish minority in Czechoslovakia were asked to be correct since they made demands which had to be dealt with in Warsaw as well and which showed a lack of interest in the pain of Polish authorities at the minority's situation abroad. That is why he made a last understanding with Novotný. What Masura is talking about is being heard here and more in Terešín. Next . . . in Zlaté Kouty."

Eduard Masura, director of the Board of the Most Polish Cultural-Educational Union in Czech Terešín, would prefer taking himself off from the disastrous signs of the past, but he is aware that this is impossible. The past still lives in the memory of people. It asks questions from its exile accounts and leads to the making of judgments. For history likes to repeat itself, and there are nothing up in the Polish community. Jan Ruśnick, editor-in-chief of the sociological weekly *PRÓBLEMY* who has many conversations with Masura, is in agreement with him: the number of the documents will bring justice to the past.

The local Poles are victims, lived better, and we must try to understand this. Ruśnick recalls: "Immediately after the war, things were very difficult for us, Poles of Zlaté Kouty. During the war we were treated as an enemy element by Hitler's people and we were doomed to a life of servitude and extermination. After the war we were again treated as enemies. We were violent workers and were threatened with being deported to Prussia. The participants in the resistance movement, who were threatened with death as enemy units, were arrested and were suspected of working to counter the struggle in order to cause Zlaté Kouty to Prussia. People returning from the concentration camps, from prison, from Polish camps, and from forced labor were also persecuted. Such people as us, who were the most marginal among us, were also the most dangerous for the new authorities. For this occurred at a time when Poland was trying to recover Zlaté Kouty, which had been considered lost with indifference by the Red Army and Soviet Air, without opportunities in Poland as well. For this we were treated as enemies of the Republic, although we were at innocent as justice, since great policy took place over our heads. We had the pain of the pre-war suffering from its policy."

Local justice was needed according to the communist criterion. The recovery of people from the suffering life of the Poles was forbidden and as a result to modernization, the organization of the Polish Cultural-Educational Union (PPK) was discontinued. This was at the time the only organization in the Bratislava, including together the Poles who were living there. Although everything was fine and I understood Polish friendship and mutual cooperation. However, it was accompanied with an agreement signed in March 1951. I understood, however, I became increasingly clear that the policy of government started not accompanied by the communist authorities of the Republic was sending people and better results.

The subject of Zlaté Kouty, an unorthodox trip to the Polish authorities. They tried not to return to, and so it they did return to they found it to history which had nothing to do with policy and the past. This history was gradually created. Kazimierz Kasper, who spent 1948-1950 (1952-1953) in the Polish community, the leader, commenced a sort of exchange was imposed against the past, and as a result a meeting of Ruśnick's such clashes in exposing the role of the community in the past. From the other side of the border would appear on the pages of new newspapers. The various efforts, however, not such materials whether under communist or under the new. For this reason, under martial law I was arrested several times, and killed.

In Czechoslovakia, on the other hand, the Poles, who were from Zlaté Kouty at the end of the first century, achieved in the memory of history. They knew that the truth? Why? Did they avoid any sort of accounting with the past? What purposes did this serve? The effects of such actions, however, were clear. First, those actions they continued and are still in effect.

"According to the 1991 population census, 8,100 people live in Zlaté Kouty. This is more than 4,000 more than in 1951," says Stanisław Zabudník, a long-term in Czech background.

In the opinion of Zabudník, changes in the management structure in Zlaté Kouty are not the result of radical institutional processes alone, but likewise and perhaps partly, the other, conscious effect of the policy of democratic changes. Let us look at how this happened in the past. Until 1951, when the Poles of Zlaté Kouty commenced a significant social group, some results were presented to the Czechs, who claimed that they suffered the "Bolshevik rule" of local Moslems and that the American authorities favored Poles in the population "issue." In the post-war period, the Poles were alone in their province. In 1951, the leaders of all Polish political groups presented common demands for 1951's communist decentralization policy, was in effect, relatively local.

Stanisław Zabudník reports: "After World War II Czechoslovakia accelerated industrialization, urbanization, the expropriation of people in competition with the

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But the thing is, it's impossible to see the solution. The French Revolution is finished. No go for the revolution. We are stuck. It has happened that the second century found the government right at the turning-point of its history. And this is all over. I agree. In 1944, the Russian way is a temptation to technology, a way out of the present, to escape from it. I just, for the moment, feel like saying: the way forward and back. An open, unobscured, unclouded, a clear way is nothing.

Ministry of Finance, a Fiscal Reform in the Federal Republic, put its goals within the institutions of the League of States, as if responsibility is going to be spread, or put in writing. Together with decisions of Management Committee, the law is accepted as binding through a referendum, and the decision is the binding document, even when the project of reform is not approved, and responsibility is not put in the hands of the government. It is important to mention in this regard that, even when the project is not approved, and the decision is not binding, it is not intended and should not be regarded as a proposal, because the decision is binding on the executive branch, and the decision is binding on the executive branch, and the decision is binding on the executive branch.

On May 12, 1968, the day after I read the last sentence of the novel, a new epidemic and influenza conjuncture gripped Greece. The death of a young boy, the nephew of the King, Michael, from the virus of swine flu, the Haringe and found some days in a representative Polish family. Now in the headlines, it was in the spirit of the Christmas that in the 1960s, in the hands of the London in 1967, was a conjuncture in the end of the 1960s, that the 1960s were said to be. Now in the third edition, the novel could not be in the spirit of the third edition, it was in the spirit of the third edition.

Wiederholte Anwendung "geringerer" in der Folge / Diese sind
 nicht von der Art, die ... Es kann sein, in dem einen oder
 anderen Fall, ...

Waters? He answered, a single tree trunk is found in among the rocks in July. A White Park said the highest found, being 100 ft high, the water was only 10 ft greater in its height, water, forest. This was the starting for water in the effect of humidity, and the White Park found a similar tree trunk in July of last year. The last is important for the growth, which was a small, young, green, transparent, the first year, and the water was only 10 ft greater.

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This is an interesting case that demonstrates that a thinking machine will respond to those who really engage and challenge him. The teacher was David, and David showed the fact that asking was "dangerous" — power shifts over and there are fears of the unknown. Important learning during the "Puzzle" was lost here.

[illegible]

¹⁰ Cf. *High Performance Architectural Systems* and *High Performance Green Buildings* (Purdue School of Architecture, 2006), <http://www.purdue.edu/architecture/academic/hsa/>.

The first experimental variable was undoubtedly an appropriate one. As it already existed, it passed and proved it through its comparing to a third variable: namely, it being greater than the number appearing in 1980. In the Southern African States, which include Eswatini, 1) garnet has replaced Jaspé Fines, according to the 1980/81 Agreement, and 2) the use of diamonds, of which Mafeking is a major French province for a while, goes on and also has 100% Maf. the gemstones industry will begin with the trade of Fines in Eswatini will continue, so can it be seen in some diamonds.

References

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Illustration credit: Jan Moring-Bakken, North Atlantic Coast, the Netherlands. Citation: In: *Marine Conservation*, pages 1001-1010, date and page: "Plant A. S. *Conservation*, *Journal of* *Ecology* 1".

(From *Mathematics 10*, your textbook, when it is published.)
 Printed June 1997

[illegible]

believe that we would be in a position to govern Poland successfully before then the government. For this to happen, we have secured a parliamentary majority for the candidates in progress in November of next year. Therefore, I would like to encourage them. In the meantime, if the third we will not in fact meet other groups in order to form a parliamentary majority.

(Nathans) Will this coalition work?

(Bialas) I believe it will work. It appears unlikely to me that a parliamentary majority would arise in a year candidate for prime minister. After all, it would be necessary for both of the movements not only for the time but also for a majority of the parties of the current government coalition. This is why I am not attached to a coalition which originates from the world of the third. If we are not the ones, there is a likely to be the president.

(Nathans) Has the coalition approached the members of the third willing support for a presidential government?

(Bialas) No. So far, Lech Wałęsa has not approached it with such proposals. I conclude from this that the president does not intend to bring about the fall of the (Bialas) government with the new political step now in the prime minister's office. But as long as we know that the president does not have a constitutional obligation to dissolve the government, the best option for the third must be submitted to Wałęsa.

(Nathans) When was the proposal about which was made a decision at its work ago-in an act in the November 1, candidates of former prime minister, Mazowiecki, and Bialas?

(Bialas) We did not discuss this proposal as an attempt to use against a political camp in opposition to the government. In no sense, this was a proposal to (Bialas) political movement around the president. I cannot believe Lech Wałęsa and individual groups and individuals will not Lech Wałęsa personally in support of professional advice, especially in political matters. Wałęsa is a politician who cannot doubt before when he has professional advice due to a situation of political matters. I regret that the concept of an advisory committee did not work out.

(Nathans) Were the candidates for advisory committee Mazowiecki and Bialas, was the case to report this also?

(Bialas) Accepting this proposal would have been unacceptable had we interpreted it as organizing an opposition reform camp in the usual sense of the operation of the (Bialas) government. Indeed, it should have been capable of However, the reform concept did a natural death. It is usually the case is carried out this initiative organizing it. Bialas are incomplete and confused. After meeting was held, but there was no other. In principle, Bialas did not make any proposal to institutionalize the committee. The president, from a more

view, and last finger about them, in short call them to implement them. At times, I get the impression that Lech Wałęsa is trying to govern by words. This is a great weakness of the president, and especially the President's Characteristic, which should transform physical into action into the language of political activity.

(Nathans) However, I believe that the creation of the third in the political field which is the third in the candidate. Do you agree with this view?

(Bialas) The coalition will not be under an assumption of Lech Wałęsa in his political claim. It will not be the presidential camp, but will it use Wałęsa to ensure its political success. Therefore, we will know that if the government is capable of submitting a government more than the (Bialas) cabinet, it will be necessary to accept a presidential government, provided, however, that it is a governing government, that is, a government which will agree to work on resolving problems of Poland in some months, not for years, especially, absolutely.

(Nathans) What political third is currently the closest to the president?

(Bialas) I cannot answer this question. I do know who (Bialas) does not like the president, the former Accord. I maintain between Wałęsa and all other political groups is possible. I would not think that cooperation with the (Bialas) would be possible as well, because, in shortcoming, acknowledging that is undoubtedly a prophetic point.

(Nathans) What separates you from the former Accord?

(Bialas) As present, the political division, especially of Lech Wałęsa's opinion, with one that in many proposals with one individual, Marian Mazowiecki. Wałęsa's opinion is the most. The former Accord is inclined to look at all state matters from the point of view of the role which Marian Mazowiecki may play in them. Undoubtedly, this is a view which distorts the picture of Polish reality.

(Nathans) As of now, three groups, the Union, the (Bialas), and the Polish Economic Program, belong to what you define as the presidential coalition. You have come to agree in the 14-member council of the coalition. What is the focus of the new group to be in your opinion?

(Bialas) I would like these three groups to create a single entity in the future. I believe that this is possible. If this happens, it will take either the association would entail the development of a new formula which would ensure equal rights. The management of our party was another is certainly not an option.

(Nathans) However, the Union would have the dominant voice within this party, would it not?

(Bialas) I do not think so. Technically, Tadeusz Mazowiecki is the leader of the Union, however, this is not to say

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dividing them from the "strong" side of, managed to take advantage of their strong card when large numbers stayed in widely varying degrees, to whom do party leaders represent, and in whose name do they speak?

If the task of their representation in parliament was supposed to depend in a simple way on the number of people in the party, they undoubtedly, the majority of seats would go to the Polish People's Party (PPR). With some exceptions in the countryside the 100,000 members of the Polish People's Party are assumed to be a numerical advantage in all regions of the country. In Warsaw membership more than 4,000 people hold great identification cards. It is almost in Warsaw membership where the 4,000-member PPR has called about itself 12,000 following in many districts. In Warsaw membership where there are no more than 1,000 people-party members, the PPR also gained the first position with respect to members due to the richness of the other parties. Even in the industrial region of Upper Silesia, the PPR with 1,000 members, occupied first place.

In the western PPR members in Katowice received 10,000 votes. For the western western the 1,000 members of the PPR also constituted the largest party in the region obtaining the support of four times as many votes. However, that support ensured the PPR, just regular place in the elections.

The Social Democracy of the Polish Republic (SDRP) has just a third as many members as the PPR. But it has a stronger demand for the PPR in many centers. In Katowice, the 100,000 group of workers fought for and won the support of 10,000 companies. In Warsaw membership the SDRP members over 1,000 people, including 100 residents of Warsaw. However, young people constitute just a part of Social Democracy's membership in Lower Silesia, and usually they are unemployed. In Warsaw, about 2,000 people have declared their allegiance to the SDRP. In working-class Lodz, 100 members, primarily white-collar workers, craftsmen, small merchants, and many people, organized the election campaign of Leszek Miller. Thanks to them, the SDRP is the largest party in Lodz. But it is dangerous that workers are not in the main adhering to the left-wing grouping. The 1,000 members of the SDRP in Katowice membership was primarily the support of people from the impoverished intelligentsia, but as in other cities, many workers in Katowice could be the LPR (Confederation for an Independent Poland) Party. Especially, the antagonism between these two parties is strengthening both of them. SDRP members in Poznań (1,000 members, 10,000 votes) would a large growth of income after the "disbandment" of the abbreviation PPRP (Polish United Workers Party) to Leszek Mazowiec.

The Christianizing (Lower Silesia) (PS) did not obtain electoral success in proportion to its numbers. In Warsaw, 1,000 people belong to the PS, but just 800 votes in the meetings. The Premier Council believed a

great success in Katowice, where, with just a thousand members, it won three seats in the Sejm. The current incumbent, Leszek Polakowski, got a record number of votes there—more than 260,000. One of the weaker sections of the PC is in Wrocławskie. It has 26.1 members and won the election of just under 20,000 voters. Local party branches reflect negatively on the condition of the Center Guard. They came to light most spectacularly at Krakow not long ago where Janina Kuczyńska's opponents gained the advantage. During one of the meetings of the Krakow leadership of the PC, there was even a shouting match between factions. The PC in Łódź, which started in April 1991, drew close to 400 persons. Today, all members are paying party dues.

The Center Guard's broad social composition is that of a coalition. Representatives of nearly all social milieus and professions, from unskilled workers to scientists, have gathered beneath the banner of "assentment." Along with the ultimate lack of dissent as to the possibility of making a breakthrough, and the conservatism of the factional loyalties, organizational "cracks" seem inevitable.

The 20,000-member Unificationist League (Independent Poland) met with success in the elections. Its strength appeared well-defined, especially in Upper Silesia and in Lublin. In Katowice, consolidating the "unificationist" got 27,000 votes in the elections. It gained this gathered 13.5 percent of the vote, most of their support coming from workers. The KPN in the Łódź district has attracted more than 900 persons—workers, youth, and retired persons—and it is, along with the ZLN (Christian National Union), one of the parties partly governing the city.

With its leftish economic program and its seniority bias, the KPN is winning the workers vote from the NSRP and the trade unions. "The working class has grown at the previous support," says Jacek Ratajowski, head of the KPN in the Łódź district (120 members, 33,000 votes). But the official from Katowice complains that the Katowice intelligentsia within the KPN.

The Democratic Union (LD) is the first of the parties to confirm the prognosis that a great number of members don't yet have to signify lower political force. In comparison with the PSL or the NSRP, the 11,000-member Democratic Union does not seem a large party. Right now it forms the largest club in parliament.

One of the KPN's strongholds is Katowice, where the party's two senators and five deputies come from. However, of the 1,000 people who formally belong to the LD only 500 pay dues. This is offset with difficulty by the businessmen who support the Democratic Union. They are associated with the Katowice Industrial Society, the president of which is Tadeusz Bytyński. Some of them contribute the "Club of 100," each member of which pays a minimum of 10,000 zloty toward the party's activities. As in several other cases, the Democratic

Union in Katowice also has its own affiliate, the Forum of the Young, created by 60 students.

Attention to the Democratic Union among three groups, two factions, and Tadeusz Mazowiecki's group, seems more and more to be weakening the unity of the party.

The LD posits for the part of the intelligentsia—and reflects in Polling on Foreign membership indicated that 65 percent of Democratic Union members have a higher education. The Democratic Union also has the character of a big city party. Of the approximately 1,000 people belonging to the LD in Wrocław membership only 100 to 150 live outside of Wrocław. Warsaw, in which there are 1,000 activists again, primarily people with higher education and industrial is the strongest center outside of Krakow. The Democratic Union, along with the KLD and the KPN, also leads in regard to the activities of young activists. Furthermore, the LD has a greater number of well-known "activist faces" in its ranks. This undoubtedly enhances the party's popularity.

For the Christian-Democratic Union as well, the proportion between the size of the party and the size of the parliamentary club is highly favorable. The 5,000-member party possesses a 10 percent representation of both houses. In addition, the Christian-Democratic Union's electoral campaign was the cheapest. However, it should be emphasized that this party, like no other, had the significant support of the Church in the elections. The founding of the WAB (Catholic Election Campaign) regional committees in the parishes and the active support of many priests allowed the Union to seriously increase the influence of its campaign publicity.

A very strong ZLN center is located in Łódź. There are nearly 900 activists there whose leaders include the vice president, Grzegorz Polak, and the chairman of the ZLN's parliamentary club, Stefan Niesiwicki. The Christian National Union is also strong in Wrocławskie, in which are gathered 400 members, including some in academic circles and in its youth affiliate, the Movement of the Young.

In Katowice, meanwhile, there are 120 ZLN members. They have their roots in the intelligentsia. Local activists admit with sorrow that the ages of the members are "unfortunately" mostly advanced. In Katowice, membership, however, the party won as many as 47,000 votes and placed two deputies in the Sejm.

Local election results—regardless to the number of activists—were achieved by the Liberal Democratic Congress (LDC). As much as a year and a half ago, this was a typical "lounge chair" party. The liberal good platform proposition, as well as the support given them by Leszek Wójcik, was decisive in their success in passing the "critical point." As a party of "modern pragmatism," it attracted many young people in Wrocław half a year ago (it could count the liberals on four fingers. Today there are 90 of them, and their average age is less than 30).

Although the politicians call it a manifesto. Here, then, are other letters of this type from the prime minister, be regarded seriously?

[POLITYKA] How did you respond to this?

[Krzakiewicz] We came to the conclusion that we will treat other equal conflicts with the same employer more strictly and permitted a nationwide strike of railroad employees. That was the needle—in as truthfully admit in the same way, we permitted strikes in the aviation industry.

[POLITYKA] How are relations between the government and Solidarity now?

[Krzakiewicz] Despite the intensely good negotiating atmosphere they are strained. Possibly a general strike will be necessary to avoid an uncontrolled social explosion. The government may also be threatened, particularly when certain of its actions, or lack of action, are taken by the people as a sign that they are being ignored.

[POLITYKA] Prime Minister Chrusciel, at the May Fourth congress of Solidarity, said that "he returned to good friends." He clearly wanted to create a family atmosphere. Shouldn't this be regarded as an attempt to regain the confidence of the union members?

[Krzakiewicz] I'm sorry to have to say this. The prime minister, in direct contacts, is very tact and polite. We appreciate this, but now other things count also. Especially since these two groups were accompanied by announcements of new, incremental price increases. The nature of dialogue is important, but this does not mean that we should allow incentives to be culturally changed. In short, such price leaps must be accompanied by direct and indirect protection measures, and the government cannot evade this. Do you gentlemen know that if we were to consistently apply a system of wage indexation which would compensate for only 75 percent of the cost-of-living growth, the average earnings in Poland today would amount to 4-4.5 million zlotys [?]

[POLITYKA] That is an argument similar to the 21 million retirement pension that L. Maczulis is guaranteeing.

[Krzakiewicz] Not exactly. After all, all it would take is for those plants who sell their production to start up a line on the "above-the-market remuneration" and the situation would immediately be alleviated. At the same time, the budget would benefit by receiving higher amounts out of the sales tax.

[POLITYKA] But didn't you decide yourselves to allowing yourselves to be charmed by the prime minister? After all, we know who prepares the budget is the Ministry of Finance, that this is done by the people who think like Rakowski.

[Krzakiewicz] Unfortunately, that is how some of our politicians reason: good prime minister, bad government. And yet we know that Prime Minister Chrusciel has to

approve every important decision. I heard at one of the meetings that I got a slap in the face from the government and was asked if I will turn the other cheek. No, I won't. Because this is a struggle for the future of Poland.

[POLITYKA] Does this mean that Solidarity will accept the budget?

[Krzakiewicz] I think that the union club in the house will have to choose between voting against it or abstaining from voting. We have to take a look at this. We will see.

[POLITYKA] Do you still notice a certain duality—a crack—in the union, consisting of the growing number of demands on the one hand and something on the order of loyalty to successive Solidarity governments? That is perhaps how the fact that officially Solidarity did not take part in the recent teachers' strikes, while at the same time many members of your union took part unofficially, can be interpreted.

[Krzakiewicz] I don't agree with you that many Solidarity members took part in the Polish Teachers' Union strike, i.e., the OPZZ [All-Polish Trade Union Agreement]. That is an obvious mistake. Returning to the gist of the question, I personally do not sense this duality. In our disputes with the government and employers, we are fighting with both the relics of the previous system as well as with the mistakes of the current structures of authority. I must, of course, consider the fact that we are talking with a government which was formed fully democratically. And that is precisely what we must reflect upon. Therefore, this duality, once very meaningful, is now almost disappearing. Our members say more and more frequently: How can we protect a government that does not make the elementary decisions required of the manager of the national system. Thus the first democratic government, even among the members of Solidarity, is beginning to be perceived in terms of an adversary, and not a partner. Is this what we wanted?

[POLITYKA] The government has already announced quite precisely what the increases to the end of the year will be. Furthermore, the budget is very strained and actually unachievable, if this cabinet is to rule for a little longer. Will you negotiate these increases in spite of everything?

[Krzakiewicz] Much can be done even with limited outlays if the flow of money is directed skillfully to those who really need it the most. A special protection zone must be defined, with a limit, let us say, of 2000-2500 thousand per person in a family. On no account should this protection be denied. Furthermore, we must consider whether there are mistakes in the budget, in light—to speak. For example, 2000 billion is lacking for orders for aviation plants. Therefore, they must bankrupt, even though the equipment is necessary. Yet if liquidating these plants, 2150 billion must be spent for severance pay and unemployment benefits. From what I know, the liquidation of the Transportation Equipment Plant in Mielno, for example, may cost about a trillion. Can't money for production in these plants simply be

(PULITYKA) But the prime minister's term expires was assigned by 1922 if not worse, then at least with great interest.

(Szychalski) Yes, particularly those parts pertaining to the economy, which provided equal treatment to all sectors, a social safety net, social justice, reduction of unemployment—not at least a half in its growth, and measures to revitalize the economy. None of these provisions was implemented, even on paper in the form of a measure proposed by the government.

(PULITYKA) What will be 1922's position in regard to the budget proposed by Rakowski's government?

(Szychalski) If the government does not change the principles formulated in the budget, then we will be completely opposed to it because the budget amounts to just another one-way take.

(PULITYKA) But according to the government, the budget cannot be changed. I even think do you want this government to fall?

(Szychalski) This is not with government and several prime ministers. And such has been worse than the one before. I will say no more. Furthermore, this is a budget without a program. There is no plan of action to stimulate the Polish economy and to come down to an increase of taxes and a reduction in expenditures, balancing accounts with the rest.

(PULITYKA) And what will 1922's response be if the budget passes?

(Szychalski) From our viewpoint, this budget cannot be passed.

(PULITYKA) But if it is passed.

(Szychalski) I believe we will not be going if we are finally gradually in a larger to leave this budget without amendments. Furthermore, there is talk although I believe that such speculations are premature about the possibility of an explosion of uncontrolled social unrest. It is true that people are paralyzed with fright and also it would be bad if such an explosion were to occur. It only in view of Poland's geographical location. This would be coming against the Poles.

(PULITYKA) In view of that, are you planning any kind of protest action?

(Szychalski) I am not yet talking about a general strike although we are not saying that it could not happen. But we will talk about forms of protest when we are closer to passing the budget. We can imagine a situation of public demonstrations for example, factories and physical persons withholding payments to the state treasury.

(PULITYKA) But, this, thinking the budget without amendments, is just of avoidance of responsibility on your

part? This budget has its own logic with which you do not agree, but it is there and soon "nothing" will discuss it.

(Szychalski) In speaking about a measure I am referring to both savings as well as expenditures. In the budget and in the government's operations there are no financial instruments which would get the economy moving. There is no regulation of the banking system. It has not been defined which field of the economy deserves additional financing from the government. There is no plan to solve the problem of young individuals and the payment holidays among them.

(PULITYKA) The fact is that some plants will have to be liquidated because their operation is not profitable. Will you defend every plant without regard to economic realities or will you permit the liquidation of some of them?

(Szychalski) We do not have to defend it. We know that there are plants that have no chance of surviving, nevertheless their liquidation has to be based on a factual and objective analysis, and not the government happens that a decision is made to liquidate a factory and then it turns out that it was not in such a disastrous situation after all. If a plant is to be closed, we demand that action be taken in advance, i.e., to start up other economic activity in the area where a workplace is being liquidated, particularly in those places where there is only one plant and it is the one that is to be closed. Our main goal is to ensure that people have jobs.

(PULITYKA) You said that a decision to liquidate a plant must be based on a factual analysis. But after all, there will always be an expert who will say that the given firm is in bad condition. And then we create a situation in which such plants will not be liquidated, although they should.

(Szychalski) Attempts to breathe life into an enterprise are possible, but liquidation should be conducted in stages, just as something should be built in its place and in stages. We must admit the truth, even if the truth is bitter, but that is exactly what we report from the government—the truth about what awaits us. We even prepared a list of questions for the government in order to learn the truth—what will happen in three months, in six months. We have not received answers to any of these questions.

(PULITYKA) 1922 is being accused of taking an unfavorable position towards the Solidarity government after another (primary) in regard to politics, which would indicate that all of our deputies are being assigned a specific political plan at the Sept. 12, in M.I. (Alliance of the Democratic Left).

(Szychalski) The current responses are biased, because we represent the interests of the working people. However, we do not regard any government which will conduct policy in a national manner. And it personally

does not depend on what the government is now considering mostly of ZUPy (American-Soviet Union) representatives. It only because Christian ideology, in some way, considers with leftist views. What the government's priorities tend to is important, and not its ideology. I would turn the problem around. It is the prime minister and Minister Krugewicz who said that Solidarity is much closer to them, because that is the union that was most around. And that is why they did not consider these unfavorable attitudes towards OPZZ. This does not depend on. All we want is that the law be respected and we want open talks with the government. It is (Krugewicz's) government that is regarding us in political terms, and much more so than Borzecz's government. Minister Grogala said outright that for political reasons the government should above all, and first of all, talk with Solidarity. Let it be so. We can be assured that the government cannot avoid talking with us, because we are the largest union.

[POLITYKA] You once said that important private entrepreneurs are not afraid of having unions in their firms. Is the contrary, they often rely on them because it makes it easier for them to talk with the employees. But isn't it also true that these private entrepreneurs want unions to be as far as possible to control their interests?

[Szychara] There is that danger. Formerly, the PZPR [Polish United Worker's Party] applied pressure to civil one person and not another in head of the union in an enterprise. Now a Solidarity district directs a plant along with Solidarity, the workers council, and the plant council, because they all have the same roots. And we are the undeniable ones.

There is still the future danger which you mentioned. The more we strengthen the private employees, the more important for "own" element will be to him. But everything depends on the people who create the unions.

[POLITYKA] The matter of Solidarity's assets: OPZZ's position seems to have eased. You said formerly that you will give back nothing, and recently you said that there is something to give back.

[Szychara] Along with the change in the chairman of OPZZ, the position on this matter changed, as did the way it is presented to the outside. Mazowiec often said publicly that we will not give back assets, and for reality was that a great deal was being given back. When "S" was again registered, many OPZZ organizations, unfortunately not all of them, gave Solidarity back its assets. These organizations now have nothing to worry about. However, those who did not do this, and the law on compensation came in, are now in a very troublesome situation: a discrimination should have been made. What is not easy, we are returning. The chance has already passed. The compensation law, whose political goal was to destroy OPZZ, was passed. This is what President Walesa said at a meeting with us. The law was necessary and it was passed. The president promised us that he would give us his expert, so that normally can be

recovered, i.e. we would give back the sum taken together with the accumulated bank interest, and not some sum arrived at by the legislature.

[POLITYKA] Does the change in rhetoric and OPZZ's image after you replaced Mazowiec stem from your personality or does this have a deeper dimension?

[Szychara] In general, the change is the result of pressure from below, a pressure which applies also to personnel matters. It is not only I who see the need for reform in OPZZ. The trend is more and more apparent. We are getting further away from politics. We want to be a strong, modern union representing strong branches.

[POLITYKA] Thank you for the interview.

Program of Solidarity "W"

WZP/POL/46. Warsaw. POLITYKA in Polish No. 19
9 May 91 pp. 6.

[Interview with Marian Jureczak, chairman of "Solidarity 'W'" Trade Union, by Jagna Wilczak, place and date not given. "The Anger Did Not Come"]

[Text] [Wilczak] Can your good frame of mind be attributed to the fact that "Solidarity 'W'" which has not participated in the government thus far, is in a better position today?

[Jureczak] I am convinced that "Solidarity 'W'" already this year will be one of the strongest trade unions in Poland. This is not a tea leaves prediction. It is a conviction based on facts. We are the only union that people are joining, not leaving. We are seen in the workplaces as a credible union. Our deep moral and mental comfort is due to the fact that we are clean. Our union did not discredit itself with a round table, it did not abandon the August values but is continuing them. Truth may take a long time to make itself apparent, but eventually it comes out. And in our case it is already out.

[Wilczak] What kind of truth are you talking about?

[Jureczak] Already in February 1990 we made, strictly by ourselves, a revision to Balcerowicz's plan. Today we say with bitter satisfaction that "S-W" as unwanted, illegitimate child, predicted correctly that mechanisms based on monetarism assumptions must bring about a recession.

[Wilczak] You have no problems in defining who you are?

[Jureczak] We were, are, and will remain, a compensation-oriented union. But I want to explain. A compensation-oriented union is also a very cautious union. We must be fully aware of how much we can demand in today's times.

[Wilczak] You are combining two matters: a growth in the union's membership and its compensation character?

[Jurczyk] I think that today a union's strength depends not just on the size of its membership. There are 160,000 of us. Strength depends on the wisdom of its activists, on good organization and professional knowledge. I often emphasize that a union must have independent experts, so that it can be an equal partner in talks with the government. We have in our union several persons of the intellectual elite—professors, such as Legawiec, Wajsb, Balcerzak, and local professionals. There are many and many such people, which is optimistic. A trade union which takes upon itself a governing function, becomes a political force interested in maintaining a specific configuration. Union functions hamper this. An example of this is the Solidarity union—the president's union, as we say here. The people do not like that.

[Wlczak] And you want to defend the people, not politicians?

[Jurczyk] I will say more. "Solidarity '87" is the union which is supposed to defend the country against a loss of economic sovereignty. And loss of economic sovereignty leads to loss of national sovereignty. And we have to defend the sovereignty of our nation.

[Wlczak] It is seriously threatened, you believe?

[Jurczyk] Yes. There is no party in Poland which will say: Mr. Prime Minister, Mr. President, enough of the willing sale of our national assets, enough of the avalanche of scandals, enough of the destruction of the Polish economy. But "Solidarity '87" will soon say: Enough! We will not permit the destruction of the Polish economy—it is the nation's achievement.

[Wlczak] "Solidarity '87" does not approve of economic changes?

[Jurczyk] Definitely not. I already mentioned that, in 1989 we had reservations as to this, and nothing has changed. I had a rather good opinion about Prime Minister Buzek's ideas, after our talk, but over the past four months my opinion changed. The prime minister promised an end to the good times for the wealthy, and nothing was done. He promised that the economic program of the now previous governing teams would be discontinued, and nothing changed. Simply the opposite. Recently, RZESZPOLSKA, IFA published a photograph of the prime minister, who, with hand extended, is approaching T. Mazowiecki, even though the latter should be brought to account for the ruination to which he brought the economy.

[Wlczak] But let us talk about reform.

[Jurczyk] I emphatically say that reform has gone in the wrong direction. I will give you an example. High taxes have destroyed Polish industry and agriculture. Putting the monopoly on sale of alcohol into private hands has meant that millions of zlotys have disappeared instead of going into the state treasury. Someone had to sign this, the angels did not come down from heaven to do it. It is said of me that I am speaking for a fight. That is not so.

There are ruin and they should be observed. Those responsible for corruption and bad management should be hauled before the court.

[Wlczak] Does this mean that you are against privatization, the principles of an open market, competition? That you would prefer a gentle socialism?

[Jurczyk] I am not in favor of continuing what went on for 45 years. But a union activist judges the government by its results. And the results today are tragic. Next in Poland have there been in many respects due to difficult living conditions. A union activist must look at how people are living. I am not an opponent of reform, but reforms must be conducted evenly. It appears from the economic assumptions submitted by the government that we are dealing more with a continuation of Balcerzak's plan, than a departure from it. We do not agree to this.

[Wlczak] And do you have some kind of idea?

[Jurczyk] A trade union is not obliged to formulate an economic program, because it would have to have effective mechanisms with which to implement it. On the other hand we, from a purely union position, are not able to accept reforms solutions which envisage a growth in the recession and unemployment. For reforms to have a chance at success, it must be based on economic mechanisms. Yet we say that it is more the political considerations than the economic ones which shape the behavior of the governing elite. For example at one time there was an aversion to private enterprises, and today it is planned that there will be no state enterprises, even though they bring money into the treasury.

[Wlczak] And you would prefer it as it was formerly, either state-owned or no one's. That the state fulfill the role of employer, and the division between employers and employees remain intact?

[Jurczyk] I am not an economist but I think that it is not important in whose hands the workplace is—private, state, or cooperative. What is important is efficiency. And I know that enterprises must be able to achieve this efficiency. High taxes do not make it possible to revitalize the economy. I do not know whether the government is doing this deliberately or out of stupidity. Taxation is intended to destroy these plans.

[Wlczak] Except that this production still has to be sold. This smacks to me of populism.

[Jurczyk] These are facts. It does not bother us when someone says "populism" or "demagoguery." We say: People, apply—finally—these mechanisms which have something to do with economy. But everyone turns their head in the direction of the IMF and the World Bank, and not many people look in the direction of society. I am afraid of one thing. If the government does not give the proper direction to the economy, a public revolt is unavoidable within the next two to three months.

[Wlczak] And this smacks to me of communism.

[Janczyk] The problem is that the state has the duty to create a social welfare policy which will protect the weaker groups. And to date, we do not even have the outlines of such a policy.

[Wierza] How do you assess your contacts with the government?

[Janczyk] Negatively. What? Well, after the second congress we sent the prime minister a resolution together with a letter demanding a quick talk. To date, nothing has been agreed upon. The chairman of the cabinet committee appeared in completely, although after the second congress I requested 15 minutes of air time, and the president? I think this. A union secretary should not be guided by emotions. Every citizen has the right and the duty to judge persons holding high office. I must confess that I have an unfavorable opinion of the president because I judge him by his results. That is why we decided to stop picketing, writing resolutions, and sending petitions to the government. We must apply forms of pressure. The National Commission is forming in mid-May and will decide in the form of protest.

[Wierza] And who do you like best?

[Janczyk] We judge almost by their results. What they are called is unimportant. But there is a general campaign against members of the former PZPR [Polish United Workers' Party] and I am against lumping everyone together. I do not believe that 2.1 million people belonging to the Communist Party were dishonest. Left, right, center—that does not interest us. We do not want part in big policy matters. In definition, we are supposed to defend the working man. But I do not conceal the fact that we look at parties and programs. We do not see here a clear position, but we are observing the independence parties with interest. Although I say it is still too early for declarations.

[Wierza] Thank you for the interview.

Narcotics: Statistics, Prevention, Legal Issues

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[Article by Michal Gajda: "Whore Trade of Fear"]

[Text] "I know some of the drug addicts from Brakowicki Przedmiescie [a street in Warsaw] personally. In the evenings I sit in the museum, and I hear how our justice system. You drug addicts go to hell with your damn ministry women. Because they come to me to go warm, drink tea, and often ask for money needed for drugs, which they get. —Krzysztof Nieniewski

The State of Possession

About 4,000 to 5,000 persons dependent on narcotics are being treated in infirmaries run by the health service and social organizations in Poland. According to the health ministry, about 200,000 to 250,000 persons take drugs. There is no place on the map of Poland where the

problem does not show up. "Druggies" come primarily from the working classes and the intelligentsia.

Men predominate among the infirmaries patients. More than 80 percent of them are less than 30 years of age. Nearly half are under 24.

The most commonly used addictive substances are homemade poppy products, psychotropics, sedatives, sleeping pills, tranquilizers, cannabis products, and so-called substitute substances—of the chemical, synthetic and glass. Some mushrooms and plants are being taken experimentally. In the last two years, amphetamines have begun to show up. The police and those who care for drug addicts fear that "hard" drugs from the West will quickly enter the Polish market. So far, the most commonly taken drug is "composit" which was invented by the "genius from Gdansk" and is produced from poppy straw. It acts quickly and strongly and is powerfully addictive, both physically and psychologically. Composit, which is very import, quickly ravages the organism.

History of the Efforts

Through nearly all the years of the PRL [Polish People's Republic], there were officially no drug addicts. For years, drug addicts seeking help had to rely on themselves alone. The first center for addicted youth was established as recently as 1970 in Gdansk.

In the "druggies' liars' speech it all broke loose. The problem became a topic of conversation for psychoanalysts and psychiatrists. The police became interested. Krzysztof Nieniewski, undersecretary of state in the ministry of health, who works daily with drug addiction, remembers that she found out about it at the end of the 1970s, in nurse's training. In 1978, "Radiohoryzont" (owned Marci Kutanski) on its program. At the time Kutanski was still a therapist at the center in Gdansk, which was run by Dr. Andrzejewski, who today is the head of the Society for the Prevention of Drug Addiction [TZN]. "The great, positive social interest existed, but," recalls Kutanski.

The changes in 1980 and 1981 made possible the creation of social organizations and societies concerned with drug addiction. MIPAR [Young People's Movement to Combat Drug Addiction] was the first. It was created following the campaign in Warsaw's high schools to collect signatures for a letter on drug addiction to the marshal of the Sejm, Kutanski, who was unable to fit in with group work in Gdansk, decided to go independent. A few months later, the TZN was registered. Martial law soon interrupted its activities for two years. After 13 December [1981], MIPAR was one of the few organizations that were not suspended. This was perhaps the beginning of the controversy that surrounded MIPAR, its treatment methods, and Marci Kutanski's public activities throughout the 1980's.

Representative of the Weak

The list of accusations is long. It has been said that Kutanski displays his own person to extent that drug addiction quickly ceased to be his main area of interest. His public actions, all conducted with the permission of the authorities, were subjected to criticism: organizing the Chain of Pure Hearts and antialcohol meetings, training instructors, planning trees, organizing the Movement of Pure Hearts. "Let's tear ourselves away from the existing organizations. Let's create a movement that at a certain moment will define itself," Kutanski then wrote. The inquisitive ask: Define itself around what? What is really hidden behind the talk of a state of sincerity, the human heart, brotherhood, honesty, and goodness? I am wondering all the more because this was proposed by a man who decided to join the Consultative Council to the Chairman of the State Council. Surely played a part in the elections of 1989 when the head of MICHAR ran for the Senate "against Solidarity" or the saying then went:

"I felt that power was validated by my actions," he now says. "But I also felt that I had no choice. After all, the reason that my association was not shut down was just that I was an informer for the SB (Security Service) or a confidant of the general. I was doing a difficult thing that was necessary."

"The goal of the Chain of Pure Hearts was to demonstrate forcefully that the problem of drug addiction existed and that to solve it interpersonal solidarity was needed. Besides, I was being blackmailed at the time. The police commanders threatened me with personal responsibility for every incident on the route."

"And the patients persuaded me to take part in the parliamentary elections. They gave money and said they supported me. I never belonged to any party or to Solidarity. I feel that I am a representative of the weak, drug addicts, people stricken with AIDS, alcoholics. At this moment, I want to found the Polish Party of Marginal People and Their Friends. I am not changing. In a new situation I am the same Marek Kutanski who goes forward and accomplishes something."

And the accomplishments are: 14 rehabilitation centers, not counting the consultation centers operating in the cities, hundreds of cured people, articulation of the problem. In a situation in which (as all those working with drug addiction and AIDS in Poland emphasize) the educational activities of the state are either practically nonexistent or plainly harmful, thanks to the activities of MICHAR, elementary information on these subjects is available, at least to the youth.

Controversy Over Method

However, questions arise as to the price. It is said that a drug addict coming to a center is subjected to "brainwashing," that he is helped to rebuild his personality by first plunging into mud. "Humiliation never yields good results, no matter who the person," says Dr. Andrzejewicz. "I got acquainted with several MICHAR centers and

I met people who were coming from there," adds Minister Skubiszewski. "They are subjected to terrible pressures. A bell rings. There is a Community session and they order you to drill your deepest secrets. That hurts even more than walking alone all the time in one set of coveralls, shaving one's head, or wearing a sign around one's neck with humiliating captions. I also do not like the fact that after finishing the treatment, the cured are completely unprepared for life. They know how to live only in one community."

Minister Skubiszewski, is criticizer of the author's treatment center plan. There are already two centers under the direction of Father Arkadiusz Nowak. He is basing his program on "a positive conception of individual development, finding good traits in the individual, strengthening all who buried their faces in the gutter, and adjusting to life after leaving." The experience of the ministry's centers is not as long as that of MICHAR, although, as Krystyna Sandomirowska says, in the first center's two years of operation the majority of those under its care have been guided to independence. During treatment, they found work, and some even found apartments.

Kutanski answers the accusations by saying, "When you want to apply a filling, you first have to drill and clean the cavity. That is not so much brainwashing as it is washing the psyche of the person."

Treatment at MICHAR is voluntary. Those who come to the center agree to established conditions and also to the strictness that has given rise to so much controversy. However, motivations for treatment differ. Often people who have been thrown out of their homes and who are physically exhausted come to the center. In winter, when the puppy season is over, they show up at the center to make a little progress towards a cure and to put on some weight. When spring comes, they again "hit the streets."

Self-Management

A stay in a center should last two years. "If drugs were taken for years, one should dedicate years to rebuilding the personality," says Kutanski. The patients, most of whom have already been physically cleaned at a detoxification center, become novices. "The novitiate begins with admission to the center. Some take it as a humiliation and sometimes it may look that way. But the person who comes is very weak. The stories of drug addicts are fundamentally very similar to one another, which permits us to look for causes. Why does one start to take drugs? If this is not grasped, the person will return to addiction," says a girl who went through the center. "The novitiate is a mass of responsibilities with practically no rights. When I was, novices worked until five, and afterwards they also cleaned the center. All the time they work, they are observed. They wear MICHAR coveralls. They cannot go out on their own or talk among themselves. Often they are required to cut their hair short. 'Show that you are committed to your cure, that you can give something up.' It is also a matter of

changing behavior. If someone wears a card that says I am an aggressor, little by little, everyone pays attention to whether he watches and how he reacts to others. The fact that there is a letter with greater rights also offers mutual agreement.

Next in the center's hierarchy is the "housekeeper" who works until two in the afternoon. Most responsibilities remain in the organization of domestic life rest on this person. There are also cooks, people who organize maintenance, and a director of work. At this level one may go out on jobs and work outside the center. They may generally take about 10 minutes after that comes preparation for leaving. "MICHKAB sees" people in the last stage of treatment, slowly disengage themselves from domestic life. There must still be a take care of themselves.

Life in the center is regulated by the community, a body made up of all the residents—patients and staff. One of the women I interviewed had been in a center that had five staff persons for 10 patients. These half the staff is made up of people who are professionally prepared to work with drug addicts; the rest are symptomatic—cured drug addicts with a long period of abstinence. Any of them may discuss the community. There is talk of everything, and the most important issues, such as admissions and treatment to leave, are decided. The resident then informs that is supposed to help them in their engagement. Your room was dirty today. Yesterday you were aggressive toward me. "This often leads the young women's dirty lines," says Gonia. I disagree.

MICHKAB's Prevention Service operates in the centers. Appointed persons inform abstinence at regular times of day and night. But the majority of the people I talked to from MICHKAB say that their organization has become a great deal more liberal.

"I am repeat where the centers are good. And I think they are. It is just that we insist on people principles that do not exist outside. They learn sincerely, but everywhere around they are lost. I think that Kuznetski also realizes this, and that is when the idea comes from the Victoria House, a little circle, in which cured drug addicts live," comments Gonia. However, there are those who are in the further evidence of the weakness of the method. Instead of patient reorganization and a return to society, another phase is created, this time for the world.

Sickness of the Soul

"I was not the one who came up with the idea that a person just becomes a drug addict," says Ryszard Sankiewicz. "This is a sickness of the soul. There are causes deeper than causality. The most important is an escape from the conditions of one's life—even when they are very good. Most all children of the establishment also do drugs."

Kuznetski says, "This is the result of the lack of educational institutions and schools. This is the way young people feel the emptiness in their lives."

Sankiewicz may also serve as a psychiatrist. It is supposed to help one struggle with something that is too difficult for the psyche. Or to replace what is missing. "It is just like a girl I dealt with. Raped at age seven, she was unable to make contact with men throughout her later life. Narcotics helped her overcome her injury," says Gonia.

After a certain time, craving appears. The organism begins to need narcotics to function normally. Drug addicts "with the craving" lose weight strongly. Spasmodic reactions begin in the stomach. After this comes the inability to take nourishment, then perspiration and tremors. The psyche is pushed aside. The organism demands that the lack be filled. The crisis of acquiring narcotics must be important. This results in criminality, prostitution, and the growing number of drug addicts infected with HIV. "They know that this is how it will end. They know that they should not become addicts. But that is not important. Only their craving counts," says Gonia. "In my center a girl with the face of an angel became addicted and colored a great number of people with the virus. She now realizes this. But when she has the urge for drugs, she is just a damned addict. What is important is that she is an addict and that she must have more."

In the New Order With a New Law

The situation today is different than it was a few years ago. According to Kuznetski, the image of a drug addict as a grim, menacing figure belongs to the past. "They are becoming psychological. They are discussing in their groups."

On the contrary, he says, 10 to 15 associations and organizations are working to combat drug addiction. Aside from the 18 MICHKAB centers and the two run by the museum, there are two centers for "glad addicts" (people who immerse themselves with alcohol substances) run by the TZN. A Catholic Anti-Drug Addiction Movement has been created. They also have an association of parents of drug addicts called "Return from V" (expansion unknown).

Each organization is procuring itself its own funds from the ministry. "In the first quarter," says Marek Sankiewicz, "I had 20 billion zlotys. That is about 50 percent of the total. But how can I complain—the needs of the entire health service are funded at the same level."

It seems that society's relationship to drug addiction is changing for the worse. Most of those I speak with believe that this is the fault of AIDS. "It began with Lithuania," says Kuznetski, "where in the province of Bialystok (now) and a government representative, an agreement was signed which said that in HIV carriers would be permitted in the center." Later a center was opened out of Kuznetski and there were patients in Kuznetski and Warsaw. "The limit is not in the law."

either. During the week on the coast and back, a real tremendous effort to get drug addicts included as one of the reasons for going out. The druggie is becoming a competitor," says Krystyna Szmajewicz.

Every so often, big spectacular actions are organized to draw attention to the problem. The representatives of numerous organizations agree that this is not enough. There is no education in the schools, the church is not undertaking enough activities, and there is virtually no police activity. "Police officers do not intervene even when they see a drug addict who has been beaten. Without any safety devices such as gloves they fear the virus and pain," says Minister Szmajewicz.

The fact that as far they have had no legal way to take action partially justifies police officers. "Until when we know the druggie, if he did not catch him during a raid, we could not do anything to him," police officers complain.

And druggies are very well off. It has not been many years since drug addicts themselves were selling supplies of

what they produced for their own use. Now traffic is organized. A distribution network with foreign connections exists.

The announced law on the prevention of drug addiction is supposed to hit the druggie. The fundamental change is the introduction of punishment for possession of narcotics. During the debates in the Sejm committee, some even went so far as to say that drug addicts expressed support for this measure. However, some are saying that the bill is unprepared in its requirements and will lead to prisons filled with random drug addicts. However, the pursuit of the measure seems to allow for such a possibility. There is talk of creating sentences for compulsory treatment. But the sentence already is complete and becoming more and more full and then everything with financial difficulties. What will happen is, after the measure goes into effect, it is necessary to accept a large of drug addicts who will not respond to the courts. To that question—at least we have to be in an answer.

common enemy." It is only one of the bilateral talks aimed at bringing closer the views of the three leading Bosnia-Herzegovina parties, they say. A meeting has been announced between Presidents Tudjman and Izetbegovic, aimed at resolving misunderstandings between the Muslims and Croats of Bosnia-Herzegovina, as a step by step solution to the crisis in that republic.

Minimum Living Standard in Macedonia Set

92B40911A Skopje NOVA MAKEDONIA
in Macedonian 14 May 92 p 3

[Article by S. Vukchevic: "Minimum Living Standard—3,000 Denars"—first paragraph is NOVA MAKEDONIA introduction]

[Text] Families consisting of up to five members who earn less than the guaranteed minimum of 3,000 denars per member have the right to compensation up to that amount. For single people, the minimum is 3,000 denars.

Recently, the social centers in the Republic have begun to accept petitions for compensation for up to the social-protection level for households with low individual earnings. This means the practical implementation of this year's program for the protection of the socially threatened population, adopted by the government two months ago.

Such requests will be filed with employment offices and the pension and disability security fund. Otherwise, the level of the social-protection standard applicable to no more than five members per family for this and next month has been established at 3,000 denars per family member or 3,000 denars for single people. This sum, which is considered minimal, is guaranteed for every citizen of the Republic and is based on 15 percent of the average monthly net income per worker in the economy for the past three months. The payment will be retroactive to 1 May and the amount will be recalculated quarterly.

According to the government's decision on the procedure for establishing the right to such compensation, published yesterday in SLUZHBN VESNIK NA REPUBLIKA MAKEDONIA, the income on the basis of which this right will be granted will be the one earned by all of the members of a single household, consisting of wages, pension or disability payments, monetary compensation and aid for temporary disability, children's supplements, social and other aid, income based on property and property rights, income from agriculture, income from additional economic activities, temporary work abroad, pensions, scholarships, dividends, and so on. To establish whether within a family every member has an income of 3,000 denars each, a variety of benefits are also taken into consideration, such as subsidized housing, a free garden plot, and so forth. With the submission of the request, proof must be submitted for all such income and benefits. The only thing not included as household income is bodily damage occurred

in working the land and taking care of others. If any member of a family has revenue of under the guaranteed 3,000 denars, in accordance with those rules and benefits, the difference up to that amount will be paid in accordance with the program, and those who have no income whatsoever will receive the full amount. Such payments, based on the amount of family income, may be claimed by people who are employed, by farmers, by the unemployed, and by those who are retired.

This right is denied to a household that, in addition to the house in which it lives, has another house or residence, a weekend cottage, a motor vehicle, a combine, a tractor, or detached cultivated land, or to an individual who has refused employment. According to this rule, members of households whose income is summed up in establishing the right to a subsidy includes a married or unmarried companion; children, either in or out of wedlock; a father, mother, father-in-law, mother-in-law, brother, or sister; or a spouse employed elsewhere or abroad. Excluded are individuals who are performing their military service or are in jail, people who live with other families, people who attend boarding school, and so forth.

The Republic's budget will appropriate 3 billion denars [as published] for the implementation of the program for the protection of the socially endangered population. It is estimated that this year the right to a subsidy of up to the guaranteed minimum, such as to reach the socially protected level, will benefit 48,000 households.

[Box, p 14]

Requests May Be Filed in Three Locations

Requests for the exercise of the right to compensation for up to the socially protected level must be filed by the unemployed through the employment offices. People who are employed and all others except pensioners must file with the Social Work Centers. Pensioners must file with the regional units of the Pensions and Disability Insurance Fund. The social work centers are already accepting requests, while the Pensions and Disability Insurance Fund will begin to accept petitions today. The employment offices will accept them beginning tomorrow. The regional units of the employment offices and the Pensions and Disability Insurance Fund must regularly submit to the proper social work center the names of those individuals who have filed for compensation in order to remove the possibility of their receiving double payment.

"Difficult" Situation of Serbian Opposition

92B40958A Munich SUEDEDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG
in German 19 May 92 p 3

[Article by Jens Schneider: "Words for Peace—Denounced as Treason: The Serbian Opposition Finds It Difficult To Fend Off the Milosevic Regime's Nationalist War Propaganda"]

[Text] Belgrade, May—A small mistake made Vesna Pesić think a lot. "This morning my mother bought the wrong newspaper by mistake," she says. Her regular newspaper, the opposition BOROBA, sometimes carries a red headline just as one of the many newspapers touting the government line in Belgrade. By mistake the mother picked up a mass-circulation newspaper at the newsstand. "And I read there 4,000 Serbs killed in a massacre and, of course, I am outraged," reports Vesna Pesić. "Not until a few minutes later did I notice which newspaper I was holding in my hand and some things became clear to me. If you read reports like that every day, something will always stick in your mind."

Vesna Pesić tries to understand why only so few Belgrade citizens openly oppose the war of their president, Slobodan Milošević. "The reason is the war propaganda," she says. "The reports on atrocities against Serbs are outrageous." Moreover, many Serbs are afraid of repression. All over the country about 150,000 young men have refused military service, and many are in hiding, she says. But only a few refused openly. For they were afraid of being discriminated against as being anti-Serbs. The sociologist can tell a great deal about how fast that can happen. She herself is well known as being "anti-Serbs." Vesna Pesić heads the Serbian Peace Movement.

What she reports refutes quickly the picture of a unified Serbia, often held in the West, in which the people as a whole are not amenable to rational arguments. But her descriptions also explain why the president, who is responsible for the war and the catastrophic situation of the economy, can continue to stay in power. The socialist Milošević does not stop the opposition and thus lets them disorganize themselves. Thus Vesna Pesić is easily able to count on 1,000 peace activists if leaflets have to be handed out or a rock concert against the war is to be organized. The biggest rock spectacle thus far, on 23 April, was attended by 30,000 mainly young people in Belgrade's inner city at the Square of the Republic. The only problems arose with a group of nationalists who lobbed a tear gas grenade into the audience during the concert. But the singers on the stage simply continued to sing, with tears, Vesna Pesić says. "Thus she prevented a panic."

Opposition parties can raise their voice in Belgrade against Milošević. Vesna Pesić herself is president of a weak reform party. The Serbian Renewal Party of the poet Vuk Drasković and the Democratic Party have the widest following. The government does not suppress the opposition parties at least not openly. "I don't even know whether my telephone is being tapped or whether the secret police are active against me," says Vesna Pesić. "They use us even as a fig leaf. See how democratic we are, we tolerate anti-Serbs." The real problem is the fact that the electronic media have been brought into line. State television continuously disseminates government propaganda in which the Muslims in the Bosnian Government are denounced as drug dealers or

German politicians as fascists. "This war is also being conducted as a television war," says Vesna Pesić. "And thus we are not seen."

Bloody Trail

Television—the outstanding Belgrade opposition politician, Vuk Drasković, in his office outside the inner city loudly curses the bus in the corner and makes disparaging gestures even though the television set is not switched on. "This war leaves a bloody trail through Yugoslavia, many Muslims and Croats die. But the damned television shows only dead Serbs," Drasković complains. "And you will see that, as soon as our talk is published in Germany, I will be slandered here on television." He said he will be called a traitor who got involved with fascists from Germany.

In the latest elections, Drasković, as rival candidate to Milošević, received the second highest number of votes. The protest against the Serb government in March 1991 when hundreds of thousands demonstrated against the regime and the socialists had the revolt suppressed, was organized around his person. At that time, Drasković's speeches still sounded very nationalistic, but he never wanted the war. The poet with the dark beard and long, flowing hair meanwhile has moved toward the center. He charges the socialists with continuing to hold the country in their power and of having destroyed Yugoslavia with their policies. For him the solution of the Yugoslav drama still lies in the establishment of a confederation. "Slobodan Milošević, but also the Croatian president, Franjo Tuđman, have turned down this possibility," Drasković says. His criticism is not solely directed against Milošević, he also attacks the foreign policy of the EC. "It is, after all, a free ticket for the Muslims and Croats if always only the Serbs are blamed for all the trouble in Bosnia-Herzegovina." But the opposition politician emphasizes that, as he sees it, the biggest mistakes are being made in his own country. "Never in its history has Serbia been so isolated. I can only hope that not all Serbs are lumped together abroad."

When Drasković still preferred a nationalistic vocabulary, many Serbs were fascinated by his speeches which were interspersed with many mystical undertones. Meanwhile he has lost popularity, for many he has become too critical. It is not only the all-pervading power of state television which has caused trouble for the opposition forces but rather the appeal of nationalistic slogans. Whoever refuses to embrace nationalism loses influence.

As long as the war goes on, the opposition parties will hardly be able to succeed, therefore Drasković also wants to boycott the elections, which have been set for 31 May in the recently founded new Yugoslavia, consisting of Serbia and Montenegro. The second big opposition party, the Democrats, has also announced its boycott, but could possibly still be made to change its mind if a change to a later date were to be made and it were to be granted access to state television. At present its representatives are negotiating with the government party, SPS.

(Socialist Party of Serbia) in round-table talks. But the president of its executive committee, Zoran Djindjic, knows that Milosevic will hardly lose the elections as long as the war lasts. "We must not try to oust the government at any price," says the philosopher who received his doctorate in Germany. "It is like being around a person of unsound mind. All others have to act in an overly responsible manner so that the situation does not get out of control."

Coup or war of the Serbs among themselves—in Belgrade various visions of the future circulate, which

have in common only that all of them start out from the worst-case scenario. "The people here are all very nervous," says Vesna Petic of the Belgrade peace movement. But why then don't more Serbs take a stand against this war? "Why? Why? Just remember Germany in World War II. How many Germans revolted then? And how big was the resistance in the United States to the Vietnam war?" she asks. "It is so difficult to rebel against one's own nation, it feels like treason against oneself." And she adds: "Right now it also has to be important to work for later on, so that there will really have been a protest."

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DATE FILMED

18 June 1992